Review of Moon Chung-In’s “The Sunshine Policy. In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea”

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In 2012, the publishing house of Seoul Yonsei University in South Korea issued a book by a well-known South Korean historian and political expert Moon Chung-In, titled “The Sunshine Policy. In Defense of Engagement as a Path to Peace in Korea.” The book was published in English, so that it became available for the broad international readers interested in Korea as well as specialists dealing with the problems of Northeast Asia and ASEAN countries. An undoubted advantage of this paper is that it is written in an excellent language, rather than being overloaded with esoteric terminologies, which makes it understandable and interesting not only to the experts of the field, but also to all who are interested in this matter. This book was easy to read and it was a real pleasure to dig into its content. Written in highly professional level, it is rich in its sources and literature with a fairly broad
The author of this book - Moon Chung-In is a principled and consistent supporter of President Kim Dae-Jung’s ideas and, in particular, his Sunshine policy. Moon Chung-In had a personal acquaintance with both President Kim Dae-Jung and President Roh Moo-Hyun – the two late presidents of South Korea who consequently realized the “Sunshine” ideas. In addition to scientific research, Moon Chung-In was also engaged in social and political activities; he was an advisor in the Ministry of National Defense, an envoy for the International Security Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, chairman of the presidential committee on initiatives in the field of cooperation in Northeast Asia. He also participated in two Summits between both South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-II in 2000 and 2007, actively participating in the formulation of Sunshine policy, to note but a few.

It is timely and symbolic that the book is published in the last year of presidential term of Lee Myung-Bak, who consequently buried the Sunshine policy in relations with North Korea. In the moment when futility of his tough and uncompromising policy toward Pyongyang became apparent, even to the supporting camp of the outgoing president and presidential candidates, including those of the ruling party, openly criticized the failed strategy of president Lee Myung-Bak ahead of a new presidential election.

However, this does not mean that the work by Moon Chung-In in whatever degree is populist and seeks to catch the trend and moods in the society. The paper was prepared during years in the atmosphere of harsh criticism of the Sunshine policy from different sides; by leaders of the
country and by the general public in South Korea. Indeed, in the last years before Lee Myung-Bak’s rise to power, the situation of inter-Korean relations has come to stagnation. International position of North Korea in the conditions of pressure and sanctions from the United States, in particular, has pushed the northerners to an accelerated development, including testing their own nuclear bomb. This circumstance was a serious blow to the supporters of the engagement policy with North Korea and, most likely, it influenced the general shift of the South Korean public attitude towards the Sunshine policy. However, the administration which replaced Lee Myung-Bak as well as candidates who fought for the presidency in the 2012 election did not seek a return to the Sunshine policy, even though they did not deny some obvious positive shifts in relation to North Korea during the implementation of the policy. In 2013, Pak Geun-Hye, a conservative candidate from the ruling party was elected the President of South Korea. After some time of her presidency, it became apparent that she was not going to continue his predecessor’s hard line and was ready to somewhat softening stance on North Korea. The concept of establishing relations with the DPRK proposed Park Geun-Hye, carries some of the ideas similar to those of Kim Dae-Jung. This is another proof that the Sunshine policy was headed to the right direction. It is also worth mention that none of Kim Dae-Jung or Roh Moo-Hyun’s presidential successors achieved any progress so far, in approaching to a certain degree of stability and calmness on the Korean Peninsula. This draws attention to a need of thoroughly studying the policies of Kim Dae-Jung on North Korea, and his concept of peaceful reunification,
Historical context and the emergence of the Sunshine policy

To date, Korea remains the only divided country. Without going into the reasons that led such a situation, we tend to note that the actual separation of the once united Korea into two opposing states in July 1953, after the signing the armistice of the Korean War 1950-1953. Countries of major powers, as well as the United Nations, were involved in the culmination of the conflict between the North and the South sides of Korea, by dividing it into two zones under the influence of both external and internal forces. The war lasted three years, ended in nothing but loss and suffering, the parties maintained their pre-war positions, and Korea remained divided. It became obvious that the use of force to solve the problem of the country’s division failed,

Although military confrontation continued in the state of – if not the end – a long pause, the lives of the two parts in the Korean peninsula continued in the economic sphere. In the postwar decades, both Korean states tried to defend their own way of development, demonstrating the benefits of their own economic and socio-political system to the world, As in war, in this new rivalry race, the DPRK and the ROK were backed up by power states. In the case of North Korea, however, the aid has been relatively limited, due to the cooled relations between the USSR and China in the 60s. North Korea couldn’t get enough aid from the side of Moscow and began to carry out more independent policy, DPRK chose not to participate in the international organizations of socialist camp, such as the Comecon (The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), the Warsaw Pact, etc. Distancing from the USSR, and they emphasized on its own resources in the
The development of the country, predetermining their economic scale that is modest at first, and over time, such move led a larger economic backwardness to the DPRK, eventually ended up growing a significant economic gap between the two countries. The collapse of the socialist bloc and the USSR, the isolationist policy of Pyongyang, and the endless economic sanctions against the country, exerted pressure on the regime, as well as a number of very large floods and natural disasters that struck the country in the mid-90s - all these led to a plight, but most importantly, they contributed to a colossal gap in the level of development and prosperity between North and South sides of the peninsula. These circumstances are constantly exaggerated and being presented by the media, as a clear demonstration of futility in the development of one state on the Korean peninsula.

However, today's media completely ignore the fact that there was in fact a dialogue aimed at the realization of peaceful reunification between the DPRK and the ROK, despite all the above difficulties and confrontation in the fields of politic, ideology and economy over a long period of time. No matter how paradoxical it sounds, but for many years, with all the differences in political and economic and social vectors in the development of the two countries at hand, they progressively developed a dialogue with an aim to find common ground and ways to achieve unification. The culmination of this dialogue was the Summit in Pyongyang in June 2000 - this event has been truly incredible since previous decades. This became possible thanks to the efforts of both sides. It brought up a good chance to actualize the political will of the South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, who at the beginning of his rule proclaimed the political concept of the
Sunshine policy for a good relationship of the two countries, making a first step to break the perennial tendency of confrontation and mistrust. Even though the initial attitude of North Koreans was not as favorable as it hoped, Kim Dae-Jung consistently implemented his new policy, which eventually made them change. The essence of the Sunshine policy was to recognize the existence of two Korean states, abandoning the idea of a forced unification or any other activities aimed at overthrowing the government of the opposite state. It was to establish a comprehensive economic cooperation, seeking to build a long-term peaceful coexistence, to strengthen the mutual trust, and to further prepare the foundations for the peaceful reunification in the future. In other words, the idea was primarily to give up hostility and confrontation, to acknowledge the rights of each other’s existence, including its own political and economic systems, and to establish mutual trust by concrete steps that push forward a mutually beneficial economic cooperation. In so doing, one could expect a progress in creating dialogue between the two positions that include non-economic issues as well. It was repeatedly stressed that in the conditions of long-term hostility and confrontation, this new policy was intended for a longer term, which did not assume an immediate result in favor of one party.

Structure of the book

The book consists of an introduction and three parts, each of which is divided into three chapters. In the first part, the author looks back at the origins, history and implementation of ideas of “Sunshine policy.” The first chapter of this part reviewed the basic principles, regulations, theoretical
background and essence of the policy, followed by the next two chapters deal with two inter-Korean summits: 2000 and 2007. These summits between the heads of two Korean States, particularly the first one, were one of the quintessential achievements of the Sunshine policy, which demonstrated the progressive potential of this kind of approach to the problem of achieving a peaceful reunification of Korea.

The second part of the book is entirely devoted to the consideration of various problems confronting the State in carrying out the "Sunshine policy", as well as the challenges that were encountered in the country and in its foreign affairs. These challenges are also divided into chapters: external, internal and military. This section of the book deals with the foreign policy doctrine of U.S. President George W. Bush and discusses the internal obstacles - and as a major obstacle, the policy of South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak is addressed. Also, the author does not overlook and problems of the arms race on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear issue.

Finally the third part of the book focuses on the probability of future prospects and the principles underlying the "Sunshine policy." It addresses specific developments and policies, so as some possible options of transforming these principles in the context of existing scenarios of Korean unification, analyzing the "Sunshine policy" in the Asia-Pacific region and providing blueprints for the feasible advance of the policy options.

In the first chapter of the first part of the book, Moon Chung-In recounts basic principles in detail—its philosophies and logics underpinning the "Sunshine policy." This chapter examines the transformation of the political and philosophical views of Kim Dae-Jung during his long career, as well as
the formation of the initial starting points and directions, which led him to understand the ways in realizing peaceful reunification of Korea in the future.

The author considers two important components of Kim Dae-Jung’s political doctrines; liberalism and constructivism. Liberalism that Kim Dae-Jung takes in the context of “Sunshine policy” is primarily manifested in the apparent rejection of rigid ideological confrontation in the dialogue with the North, and secondly in tolerance of the North Korean regime, in spite of the negative image of the latter by the international opinions. Moon Chung-In himself, as already noted, worked a lot in the team of Kim Dae-Jung and knew him personally, which help him understand exactly how the ideology of Sunshine policy shaped and find the essence of his policy.

The second and third chapters of the first part are entirely dedicated to the story of the first and the second inter-Korean Summits at the highest level, respectively. The author expounds many circumstances and context of the preparation, as well as the implementation of the Summits between the heads of North and South Korea, Moon Chung-In draws parallels between the various aspects of these two high level talks, whose time interval in between was slightly more than seven years. Moon Chung-In articulates the idea that each of the summits had its task and purpose. In the case of the first Summit of the heads of the DPRK and the ROK, the fundamental importance was to hold the meeting itself, because of its symbolic significance for the history of the whole Korea. In the case of the Summit in 2007, the attention was shifted into a practical field and its focus was to deal with the specific steps and measures for the normalization of relations
between the two Koreas, so as the implementation of joint projects.

The second part of the book is entirely devoted to the challenges of the Sunshine policy, both internal and external. Three chapters reflect what the author defines as large groups of problems: external challenges, internal challenges and military aspects. The foreign policy doctrine of the U.S. President George W. Bush, who classified North Korea as one of the “axis of evil,” caused the development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, consequently freezing the six-party talks on the settlement of the Korean nuclear issue. The author discusses in detail about these phenomena as external challenges of the Sunshine policy in the first chapter of the second part. This part of the book appears to be one of the most interesting sections, as it deals with the varying aspects of the unsolvable problems in the last years in Korea - stumbling on blocks of numerous peace initiatives that aimed to resolve the long-term Korean strife. The spectrum of issues both in the short and long term, will not disappear, but will only continue as periodic aggravation. It is not surprising that author’s partial conclusion for these problems comes down to a well-known thesis; the settlement of the Korean issues depends on the normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Washington. It is very important that the author stresses it here, because this thesis is not a unilateral requirement or pre-condition imposed by the North Korean side, but a straight up reality of the Korean Peninsula, originating from many factors, especially from military-political Alliance of the USA and the Republic of Korea.

The second chapter of the second part of the book is devoted to the domestic challenges of Sunshine policy, dealing with the turn in the relations between the two Koreas after Lee Myung-Bak of the conservative
party was elected as the President of the Republic of Korea. Despite the fact 
that throughout his term the approaches and some of the tenets of his 
policy toward North Korea has undergone certain changes, Moon Chung-In 
comes to the conclusion that, as a whole, the policy of Lee Myung-Bak 
remained reactionary, rigid, even punitive, and ultimately did not bring the 
desired result in any of its directions. The author criticizes the position of 
the new administration in many areas. Among other things, he strategically 
notes the important and fundamental mistake of Lee Myung-Bak. Curtailing 
cooperation with the North on a wide range of areas in the economic field 
led to the fact that China is actively took all possible niches that South 
Korean companies have previously worked. It greatly contributes to the 
attitude of China loosening towards South Korea, and will have far-reaching 
implications for any probable scenario of Unification.

One of the essential argument of the author is that in reality there was 
much less pragmatism in Lee Myung-Bak’s position than what can be seen 
as fundamentally ideological and dogmatic paradigm, which ultimately led 
to the absence of any positive results. Moon Chung-In examines the errors 
of the Lee Myung-Bak’s policy in detail, in the numerous nuances, making 
a relatively objective picture of impossibility of this approach in solving the 
North Korean problem.

One chapter in the book is devoted wholly to the arms race on the 
Korean peninsula in the context of the thaw caused by the Sunshine policy 
and the tensions that followed by abandoning of the policy. One fact draws 
attention with regard to military arms race on the Peninsula during the years 
of the Sunshine policy and aftermaths. Whether it was a thaw, a coldness, 
or even an aggravation in relations between the two countries - military
Budgets of the DPRK and the Republic of Korea grew steadily.

However, it is interesting that in the period from 2000 to 2005, the amount of budget expenditures on weapons in North Korea has grown dramatically despite the fact that the percentage of the total budget has remained the same. This indirectly indicates a significant increase in the overall budget of the country as a result of the normalization of relations between the DPRK and the international community, due to the implementation of the Sunshine policy and the total detente in the region. Moon Chung-In also notes on the issue of secret nuclear arms race between the North and the South.

Summarizing this part of the book, the author, in my opinion, consciously or not, avoids one conclusion that follows directly from the logic of the preceding narrative. External challenges to the implementation of the Sunshine policy are not the cause, but the consequence of a very specific global strategy for single power domination. The arms race on the Peninsula, the creation of North Korean nuclear weapons, and the military-political partnership of the Republic of Korea and the United States are the result of direct or indirect dependence and interaction with this center. This is important since the agreements between the North and the South of 1972, 1991, and the Sunshine policy and joint declarations in 2000 and 2007. The thesis requires both parties to overcome this inclination to any external center of power, in order to determine their fate independently and not to weave it into the scheme of interrelations between the center and the periphery. The dialogue between the DPRK and ROK should take place on equal terms, and not in the context of any external allied structures of any of the parties to this dialogue.
The third part of the book, consisting of three chapters, discusses the future of the Sunshine policy. Moon Chung-In begins with the fact that unlike South Korea, intentions and objectives of the Unification from the point of view of Pyongyang are unclear. Indeed, the lack of information and communication is an important issue in building relations with the North. The real intention of the Korean side in this context are defined by practical steps and actions, as well as the likely prospects dictated by changes in the leadership of the country, etc. Moon Chung-In links various models of Korean unification with internal system changes in North Korea. The author then examines different ways to coexist between two different systems and states (the European Union, Federation or Confederation) and existing variants of Association (Germany, Vietnam, Yemen). However, the author then unilaterally considers the potential political change in North Korea, the essence of which is to bring the DPRK to one of the current models of the modern state in the traditional Western sense. At the same time, Moon Chung-In neither mentions that the inconsistency and sharp turns in the foreign policy of the ROK and the United States cause more damage to the idea of peaceful reunification than uncertain motives of the DPRK. It is to say that the current economic hardship in North Korea is largely the result of long-term policy of exterior insulation and pressure, sanctions and restrictions of opportunities for foreign economic cooperation. This derives the current state and internal political situation in the DPRK, and forces them to resort the use of both appropriate and inappropriate diplomatic, and often provocative ways to defend their independence and the right to exist.

Moon Chung-In notes that the first of four scenarios actually was the
principal of Lee Myung-Bak administration, and that he built it as a long-term plan. The author barely considers the second and third scenarios, indifferent to the chance of sudden reversals. However, according to the derivation of Moon Chung-In, the majority of countries in the region presents status quo, which is convenient, and its violation of bodes will be a big shock—and such scenarios still seem unlikely. To the fourth scenario, the author pays more attention and examines this possibility in the context of opportunities for a “new” Sunshine policy.

Conclusions and critical notes

Moon Chung-In many times noted that many American and South Korean authors and, of course, the critics of Sunshine policy overlooked the fact that the process of normalization of relations (and you cannot move on until you reach it) is a long-term phenomenon. It requires economic stability above all, and only then the overall balancing of the situation within the society will be resulted. Let us not forget the fact that even 20 years after General Park Chung-Hee’s rule in South Korea the country continued to remain authoritarian with continuous violations of democratic values, not to mention human rights. Comparing to the legacy of Park Chung Hee, much less time has passed since the Sunshine policy. The external political pressure from the United States and the international community’s sanctions and restrictions of foreign trade activities of the DPRK only retard the progress any change made within the country.

Considering the various probable scenarios for the unification of Korea, Moon Chung-In does not exclude a peaceful solution based on national
consensus. Rather than the scenarios of absorption, power unification, and unification with the intervention of a third party, the author associates the Sunshine policy with the model of peaceful reunification. In a separate subchapter, the author makes a brief analysis of the likely obstacles and interferences in case of a peaceful unification of Korea. And here, in my opinion, Chung Moon-In misses one of the most serious factors that not only can become an obstacle to the peaceful unification of the country, but also has repeatedly proved itself as a real instrument with a direct impact on the process of self-rapprochement between the two Korean States. This is exactly where the external or foreign affairs should have been focusing on in the first place. On the one hand, the book has a whole section devoted to external challenges for the policy of Kim Dae-Jung. On the other, however, considering the foreign policy doctrine of the administration of President George W. Bush, the course of the six-party talks on the Korean issue, or even considering the North Korean nuclear problem, the author sees them not as obstacles but as challenges.

There is a fundamental difference in describing these issues as obstacles and challenges beyond the level of phraseological rhetoric. These are not challenges; it comes from a principal stance that produces various forms of challenges depending on the development of inter-Korean dialogue. In this respect, it is very characteristic that the long-term process of normalization of relations between the North and the South requires sequential and successive steps, which is seriously undermined due to the internal changes in the political elite of South Korea and the United States. When the administration of President George W. Bush elected in late 2000, the US position on the issue of the Korean settlement changed drastically, causing
considerable damage to the achievements of the previous administration, jeopardizing the continuation of the dialogue. As well as later in 2008 the new Lee Myung-Bak administration has actually refused to recognize the agreements of its predecessors, and “curtailed” the Sunshine policy in my opinion, and destroyed all that has been created earlier for so long. North Korea, in return, also made a serious step to undermine confidence, and largely discredited the positive results of the Sunshine policy in the eyes of South Korea, resulting in the possession of nuclear weapon in North Korea—officially stated by the international community in 2006. This was openly contrary to the inter-Korean agreements reached long before the Sunshine policy. However, if we take into account the argument of Pyongyang as to the reasons that prompted the DPRK to develop its own weapons of mass destruction, it certainly is a reaction to the aggressive U.S. policy in relation to the countries of the so-called “axis of evil” or “rogue states” that the Bush administration tagged as one of the evil states. We will have to admit the fact that such external threat have played and will continue to play a huge role in the problem of inter-Korean settlement.

Many times in the paper does the author mention the role of the world community in the settlement of the Korean problems. Kim Dae-Jung repeatedly spoke in his speeches and writings about the role of the world powers in facilitating the resolution of the Korean issues. On page 55 the author speaks about the impact of external factors on the process of inter-Korean settlement after the 2000 summit, and in this respect, it was impossible not to mention the first major visit at the highest level to Pyongyang, after the signing of the joint Declaration in 2000. One of the first foreign trips of the Russian leader - Vladimir Putin after his election as
president - was a visit to North Korea in July 2000. Thus, Russia demonstrated not only her desire to re-establish the spoiled relations with North Korea, but also to show the world community that North Korea is not a “rogue state,” or “the smithy of the world terrorism,” but a potential partner seeking to cooperate. This visit marked the beginning of a whole series of visiting DPRK by senior officials of the EU and the normalization of relations between the DPRK with the West. Perhaps the quintessence of such a breakthrough in international relations was the visit to Pyongyang by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in the fall of 2000. All these, together with the efforts provided by the South Korean leadership, certainly helped to reverse the existing trend of negative perception of North Korea by the world community, and significantly improved the situation on the Peninsula, and this, in turn, gave a powerful new positive impetus to economic cooperation between the DPRK and the international community.

In this context it is NOT clear why has the author in his book almost completely ignored the role of Russian foreign policy in the establishment of the “thaw”, which took place early 2000s on the Korean peninsula. It is the positive external background, largely initiated by the Russian side, providing the most important and favorable context that was needed in the initial period of realizing the Sunshine policy, and a fresh impetus in favor of the further progressive development of dialogue between the two Koreas.

On page 24 the author briefly mentions the importance of including Russia in the settlement of the Korean problem, but in a tone of generally agreeing with the position of Kim Dae-Jung, only to the level of which the author appeals to the format of the quadripartite participation.

Considering the internal difficulties in the implementation of the Sunshine
policy, especially after Lee Myung-Bak coming to power of administration, Moon Chung-In consistently criticizes the actions of South Korea, which did everything possible to destroy the achievements of the previous administrations in the field of inter-Korean relations. But at the same time on page 136 the author concludes: “Certainly, North Korea deserves lion's share of blame for the ongoing military tensions and strained relations.” This unequivocal statement is difficult to accept at least due to the fact that the book repeatedly puts forward the thesis that the North Korean regime is not irrational and quite consistent in dialogue, provocative action by the North are always just a response to the external pressure. Therefore, we cannot agree with the unilateral shouldering of the entire burden of responsibility for the aggravation of inter-Korean relations is solely on the DPRK at the turning point of the first and second decades of the XXI century. “Achievements” of South Korea and the US in this regard have yet to be appreciated.

Strictly speaking, it is the U.S. and South Korea who are largely responsible for changing the situation on the peninsula after the failure of the Sunshine policy. However, this thesis slips between lines in the Moon Chung-In’s book. The author makes an ambiguous point in his thesis about a peaceful scenario in the traditional Western sense, which assumes an obligatory adoption by the parties of democracy as well as the market economy, as an unconditional basis for a future of unified Korea. Moon Chung-In here refers to the authoritative opinion of Francis Fukuyama. At the same time, it should be noted that the views of the latter are controversial and debatable in modern economic thought. One cannot ignore some assessment that the South Korean model of economic
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development of the past half century has demonstrated that the principles of free market economy work much less efficiently than a centralized state planning development of the country as a whole.

In my opinion, Moon Chung-In avoids another issue in this paper that is directly related to the implementation of the fundamental and long-term strategy, to achieve a peaceful reunification of Korea. Obviously, Korea's Unification under completely different socio-economic and political systems is a massive task, given the huge disparities in the level of wealth between the two societies, in the context of the global and regional situations. It takes time and consistency.

These sorts of strategies should be addressed outside of the internal political disturbances. There is a reason why the both sides carefully worked out the principles for so many years, on not even a unification itself, but simply on a dialogue as a way to get together. Inconsistency and a radical change are evidently detrimental to the inter-Korean relations, because it undermines trust—the basis for a continuous dialogue and cooperation. Unfortunately to date, this has been an issue not with the North Korean regime, but with the South Korean administrations. On page 116, Moon Chung-In directly indicates that despite the fact that negotiations with North Korea are not easy, the regime of Kim Jong-il is not irrational, but rather consistent and has been repeatedly demonstrated commitment to establish a normal and equal dialogue. Whenever the dialogue process goes normal in a constructive way, Pyongyang is open for cooperation. Provocative actions by North Korea are always a response to similar moves of South Korea or the United States. All of these were perfectly demonstrated in the six-party talks. Here the author is compelled to
recognize that a normal dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang is impossible without normalization of relations between Pyongyang and Washington. And sharp turns in foreign policy toward North Korea by both Seoul and Washington are equally disastrous for a positive continuation of the inter-Korean rapprochement. This fact should be borne in mind and taken into account during the elaboration of the mechanisms of practical implementation of the policy or strategy based on the principles of the Sunshine policy.

Considering the origins and the process of forming future ideology of the Sunshine policy of Kim Dae-Jung, Moon Chung-In is not very specific about the reason why the concept proposed by President Kim had a lot in common with the model of the Unification proposed by Kim Il-Sung. There is a well-known difference in the two concepts, but Moon Chung-In, in my opinion, avoids two points. First, it should have been pointed out that Kim Il-Sung’s concept was proposed much earlier. And the second point is the question whether the difference between these two concepts is principle or not. The book by Moon Chung-In definitely lacks a proper analysis here in our opinion.

However, throughout the paper of Moon Chung-In, one can see that a very important thesis was slipped between lines, without offering a determined conclusion. The basics and principles of national reunification contained in the concept of the Sunshine policy are entirely consistent with the principles and spirit of the joint Declarations of North and South from 1972 to 1991. This is a very important message, because the aforementioned Declarations were the result of joint work of representatives of both Korean States. This is the realization of the principle “uriminjokkiri,” autonomy and
independence in solving the reunification question for Koreans.

At the end of the book the author lists the main issues in which the Sunshine policy has been criticized by the experts as well as the general public, including the conservative wing of the South Korean establishment. Each of these matters, in my opinion, definitely has right to exist, and in most cases, the legality of a critical remark does not cause negative comments. Despite the fact that the policy of Lee Myung-Bak towards North Korea was increasingly criticized both inside and outside Korea, the new president of the country Park Geun-Hye continues as his predecessor, albeit in a more moderate key. It is obvious that no new turning point has happened, and the return to the Sunshine policy is hardly possible in the nearest future. But does this mean that the philosophy and the basic principles set out in this policy are not viable and relevant today?

Author's work convincingly demonstrates alternative possibilities in the implementation of policy on North Korea. It is very real since the current tension on the Peninsula is to a large scale artificially created. The main thing that Moon Chung-In clearly shows in his work is the fact that the Sunshine policy, its engagement instead of confrontation, demonstrated the effectiveness in the very short term.

I trust that a long-term potential for the underlying ideas of this policy can be far more efficient. Albeit the continuous tensions that are artificially stirred, in order to instigate the public with a forced scenario addressing the split of Korea, the author of the book demonstrates obvious advantages of the different approaches in resolving the issues of the Korean peninsula, defending the principles of peaceful solution for both domestic and international problems, while seeking to autonomously find ways out of the
situation for the unified Korean people.